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ABSTRACT
We design jamming resistant receivers to enhance the robustness
of a massive MIMO uplink channel against jamming. In the pilot
phase, we estimate not only the desired channel, but also the jam-
ming channel by exploiting purposely unused pilot sequences. The
jamming channel estimate is used to construct the linear receive fil-
ter to reduce impact that jamming has on the achievable rates. The
performance of the proposed scheme is analytically and numerically
evaluated. These results show that the proposed scheme greatly im-
proves the rates, as compared to conventional receivers. Moreover,
the proposed schemes still work well with stronger jamming power.
Index Terms—Massive MIMO, jamming attack, receive filter.
1. INTRODUCTION
As a promising candidate for the emerging 5G wireless commu-
nication networks [1, 2], massive multiple-input multiple-output
(MIMO) has recently received a lot of research attention. This
technology has demonstrated unprecedented spectral efficiencies by
serving many tens of users on the same time-frequency resource.
The physical layer security aspects of massive MIMO are rela-
tively unexplored. While massive MIMO is robust against passive
eavesdropping [3], active jamming attacks is an issue. The extra
pilot contamination caused by jamming leads to a significant perfor-
mance loss [4]. Although jamming exists and has been identified
as a critical problem for reliable communications, there are only a
few works focusing on the jamming aspects in massive MIMO [3–
6]. For instance, the authors of [3, 4] consider secure transmission in
a downlink massive MIMO, in the presence of attackers capable of
jamming and eavesdropping. Optimized jamming is considered for
uplink massive MIMO in [5], which shows that a smart jammer can
cause substantial jamming pilot contamination that degrades the sum
rate. The paper [6] investigates the artificial noise-aided jamming
design for a massive MIMO transmitter in Rician fading channels.
Pilot contamination appears when the pilot signal, transmitted
for estimation of a user channel, is interfered by another signal [1].
The typical effect is that the base station (BS) cannot use the esti-
mated channel to coherently combine the desired signal, without also
coherently combining the interference. Pilot contamination between
legitimate users of the system is a challenge in massive MIMO, but
can be handled by pilot coordination across cells [7] or by exploiting
spatial correlation [8, 9]. The problem with jamming pilot contam-
ination is more difficult to deal with, because the jammer attempts
to create maximum pilot contamination rather than minimum. Since
the structure and properties of the jamming attack is limited, a typi-
cal approach to deal with jamming signals is to treat them as additive
noise and design the transceivers as if there was no jamming [4, 5].
The authors would like to acknowledge useful discussions on this topic
with Mohammad Razavizadeh.
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Fig. 1. Massive MIMO uplink under a jamming attack.
However, jamming is not noise-like since the desired channel esti-
mate is correlated with the jamming channel.
In this work, we propose jamming resistant receivers to achieve
robustness of the massive MIMO uplink against jamming attacks.
In particular, we construct the receive filters using not only the de-
sired channel estimate but also an estimate of the jamming channel.
To this end, we exploit purposely unused pilot sequences, which are
orthogonal to the pilot sequences assigned to the users, to estimate
the jamming channel. The estimate of the jamming channel is used
to design receive filters that reject the jamming signal. We consider
two different receive filters, which are motivated by the conventional
linear minimum mean square error (MMSE) and zero-forcing (ZF)
filters. In order to evaluate the performance of the proposed schemes,
the achievable rates are analyzed and closed-form large-scale ap-
proximations are obtained. Simulation results are also provided to
verify our analysis.
2. PROBLEM SETUP
We consider a single-user massive MIMO uplink consisting of a BS,
a legitimate user and a jammer as depicted in Fig. 1. We assume
that the BS is equipped with M antennas, while the legitimate user
and the jammer have a single antenna each. This basic model cap-
tures the main principle of jamming, and can be easily generalized
to having multiple legitimate users.
Let us denote h ∈ CM×1 and g ∈ CM×1 as the channel
vectors from the legitimate user and the jammer to the BS, respec-
tively. We assume that the elements of h are independent and iden-
tically distributed (i.i.d.) zero-mean circularly-symmetric complex
Gaussian (ZMCSCG) random variables, i.e., h ∼ CN (0, βuIM ),
where βu represents the large-scale fading. Similarly, we assume
g ∼ CN (0, βjIM ), where βj is the large-scale fading. The channels
h and g are independent.
We consider a block-fading model, in which the channel remains
constant during a coherence block of T symbols, and varies indepen-
dently from one coherence block to the next. The communication
between the legitimate user and the BS follows a two-phase trans-
mission protocol. In the first phase (pilot phase), the legitimate user
sends pilot sequences to the BS for channel estimation. In the sec-
ond phase (data transmission phase), the legitimate user transmits
the payload data to the BS. We assume that the jammer attacks the
system both in the pilot and data transmission phases.
2.1. Pilot Phase
During the first τ symbols of a coherence block (τ < T ), the user
transmits a pilot sequence su of length τ symbols. This pilot orig-
inates from a pilot codebook S containing τ orthogonal unit-norm
vectors. We assume that τ is larger than the number of active users,
which in this cases means that τ ≥ 2. We further assume that the
legitimate system uses a pilot hopping scheme such that the jammer
cannot know the user’s current pilot sequence. Therefore, the jam-
mer randomly chooses a jamming sequence sj uniformly distributed
over the unit sphere. By sending the jamming sequence sj ∈ Cτ×1,
which satisfies ‖sj‖2 = 1, the jammer hopes to interfere with the
channel estimation.
Accordingly, the received signal at M antennas of the BS in τ
symbol times of the pilot phase can be stacked and given by
Yt =
√
τpths
T
u +
√
τqtgs
T
j +Nt, (1)
where Yt ∈ CM×τ , pt and qt are the transmit powers of the user
and jammer during the pilot phase, respectively. The additive noise
matrixNt ∈ CM×τ is assumed to have i.i.d. CN (0, 1) elements.
2.2. Data Transmission Phase
During the last (T−τ ) symbols of a coherence block, the user trans-
mits its payload data to the BS and the jammer continues to interfere
by sending a jamming signal. Let us denote by xu (E{|xu|2} = 1)
and xj (E{|xj|2} = 1) the transmitted signals from the user and the
jammer, respectively. The receivedM × 1 signal at the BS is
yd =
√
pdhxu +
√
qdgxj + nd, (2)
where pd and qd are the transmit powers of the user and the jammer
in the data transmission phase, respectively. The noise vector nd is
assumed to have i.i.d. CN (0, 1) elements.
To detect xu, the BS uses a linear receive filter as follows:
y = aHyd =
√
pda
H
hxu +
√
qda
H
gxj + a
H
nd, (3)
where a ∈ CM×1 is the receive filter, which will be carefully se-
lected in the next section to reject the jamming.
The received signal in (3) can be rewritten as
y =
√
pdE{aHh|sj}xu +√pd(aHh− E{aHh|sj})xu+
√
qda
H
gxj + a
H
nd. (4)
By treating
√
pdE{aHh|sj} as the deterministic channel that the de-
sired signal is received over and treating the last three terms (which
are uncorrelated with xu) as worst-case independent Gaussian noise,
an achievable rate for the massive MIMO uplink is
R =
(
1− τ
T
)
Esj {log2 (1 + ρ)} , (5)
where
ρ =
pd|E{aHh|sj}|2
pdvar{aHh|sj}+ qdE{|aHg|2|sj}+ E{‖a‖2|sj} (6)
is the effective signal-to-interference-and-noise ratio (SINR).
We note that the effective SINR ρ in (6) is conditioned on sj. In
order to realize the achievable rate in (5), the BS needs to know the
numerator and the denominator of ρ. Although sj is assumed to be
unknown, we will later show that ρ only depends on the correlations
of sj and the legitimate pilot sequences, which can be estimated with
high accuracy based on the received pilot signal’s power whenM is
large. We also stress that the receiver processing proposed in the
next section will not exploit any instantaneous knowledge of sj.
3. CHANNEL ESTIMATION AND JAMMING RESISTANT
FILTER DESIGN
The achievable rate in (5) highly depends on choice of receive filter
a. In this section, we consider two different receive filters, which are
constructed based on not only the estimate of the desired channel but
also on an estimate of the jamming channel.
3.1. Channel Estimation
In order to estimate the desired channel h, the received pilot signal
Yt is first correlated with the user’s pilot sequence su as
yt = Yts
∗
u =
√
τpth+
√
τqts
T
j s
∗
ug +Nts
∗
u. (7)
The linear MMSE estimate of h given yt is given by [10]
ĥ = cuyt , α1h+ α2g+ n1, (8)
where cu =
√
τptβu
τptβu+qtβj+1
, α1 = cu
√
τpt, α2 = cu
√
τqts
T
j s
∗
u, and
n1 ∼ CN (0, c2uIM ).
As we can see from (8), the desired channel estimate ĥ is cor-
related with the jamming channel g, i.e., E{gH ĥ|sj} = Mα2βj .
Without the knowledge of the jamming channel g, the receive fil-
ter a is generally chosen as a linear function of ĥ. One example is
maximal ratio combining (MRC) with a = ĥ. Any such receive fil-
ter, which is correlated with the jamming channel, also amplifies the
jamming signal and thus degrades the rate [4].
In order to mitigate the effect of the jamming, we propose to
design the receive filter based on both h and g. However, since h
and g are not available at the BS, we can construct receive filters
using their estimates instead. Recall that there is at least one unused
pilot sequence in the system, which is orthogonal to the user’s pilot
su. By projecting the received pilot signal Yt onto this unused pi-
lot sequence, the user’s pilot signal is eliminated, leaving only the
jamming signal (and noise). The resulting signal is
ĝ = Yts
∗
u , bg+ n2, (9)
where su is the unused pilot sequence, s
T
u s
∗
u = 0, b =
√
τqts
T
j s
∗
u,
and n2 ∼ CN (0, IM ). This is an estimate of the jamming channel.
Based on the estimates ĥ and ĝ, we will construct two receive
filters, which are inspired by the conventional MMSE and ZF filters.
3.2. MMSE-type Receive Filter
First, we consider the MMSE receive filter, which is optimal when
the receiver has perfect CSI. We rewrite the received signal in (2) as
yd =
√
pdĥxu +
√
qdĝxj +
√
pdeuxu +
√
qdejxj + nd,
where eu , h−ĥ and ej , g−ĝ are the desired and jamming chan-
nel estimation errors, respectively. By treating w ,
√
pdeuxu +√
qdejxj + nd as equivalent uncorrelated additive Gaussian noise,
an MMSE-type of receive filter can be obtained as
ammse =
(
ĝĝ
H +
Ψ
qd
)−1
ĥ, (10)
ρmmse ≍ Mpdα
2
1β
2
u
M
(
σ/(qdM)+1
σ/(qdM)+γj
)2
qd|α2|2β2j +
(
α21βu(pdβu + 1) + c
2
u + |α2|2βj |b|
2βj+(σ/(qdM)+1)
2
(σ/(qdM)+γj)
2
) (11)
ρzf ≍ Mpdα
2
1β
2
u
Mqd|α2|2 β
2
j
γ2
j
+
(
α21βu(pdβu + 1) + c
2
u + |α2|2 βjγj
) (13)
where Ψ is the covariance matrix of the signal associated with esti-
mation errors plus noise, i.e.,
Ψ = E{wwH} = σIM ,
where σ = pdβu(1− cu√τpt) + qd(βj(1 + qt) + 1) + 1.
Note that our setup includes jamming pilot contamination,
which makes the equivalent noise w correlated with the estimated
channels ĥ and ĝ. The receive filter in (10) is thus no longer a true
MMSE filter, i.e., ammse may not be optimal. Thus, we call ammse
an “MMSE-type” receive filter.
Moreover, when a = ammse, the effective received SINR in (6)
can be evaluated as in the following proposition.
Proposition 1. Assume that the MMSE-type receive filter is used,
then a large-scale approximation of the effective SINR is given in
(11), where γj = |b|2βj+1 and≍ denotes asymptotic equivalent re-
lation, i.e., f1[M ] ≍ f2[M ] is equivalent to f1[M ]−f2[M ]M→∞→ 0.
The proof of Proposition 1 is given in the appendix. From (11),
we can see that when M → ∞, the effective received SINR con-
verges to a finite limit. However, as we will show in the numerical
results, the proposed receive filters can remarkably reduce the effect
of the jamming attack.
3.3. ZF-type Receive Filter
Although the MMSE-type receive filter in (10) is a linear filter, it still
has high complexity, especially in large systems since it involves a
matrix inversion operation. We next consider a simpler receive filter,
which does not require the matrix inversion operation. Motivated
from the fact that the jamming signal is the main source of interfer-
ence, we consider a receive filter that focuses on nulling the jamming
signal, i.e., a ZF-type of receive filter.
Based on the estimated channels ĥ and ĝ, a ZF-type receive filter
can be obtained as
azf =
(
IM − ĝĝ
H
‖ĝ‖2
)
ĥ, (12)
which projects ĥ orthogonally to ĝ. When a = azf , the effective re-
ceived SINR in (6) can be evaluated as in the following proposition.
Proposition 2. Assume that the ZF-type receive filter is used, then
a large-scale approximation of the effective SINR is given in (13).
The proof of Proposition 2 is similar to the proof for Proposi-
tion 1, which is omitted for brevity. We note that when the number
of antennas M → ∞, both the received SINRs with MMSE-type
and ZF-type receive filters converge to the same finite value, i.e.,
lim
M→∞
ρmmse = lim
M→∞
ρzf , ρasy =
pdα
2
1β
2
uγ
2
j
qd|α2|2β2j
. (14)
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Fig. 2. Achievable rates for varying number of antennas.
4. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we numerically evaluate the achievable rates of the
massive MIMO uplink with different receive filters, including the
proposed jamming resistant receivers. We consider a coherence
block of T = 200 symbols, τ = 3 and βu = βj = 1. For com-
parison, we also include the rate achieved by the traditional MRC
receiver, that does not use the estimate ĝ, i.e., a = amrc = ĥ [5].
Fig. 2 shows the achievable rates versus the number of anten-
nas at the BS. As expected, the proposed receive filters based on the
jamming channel estimate can remarkably improve the performance
of the system, as compared to MRC. The achievable rates from our
analysis (curves with “Anal.”) are close to the Monte-Carlo sim-
ulations (curves with “Simul.”), and will be asymptotically equal.
Moreover, we can see that the ZF-type receive filter works particu-
larly well and outperforms the MMSE-type receive filter. This shows
that in massive MIMO, where the jamming effect is critical, a favor-
able receiver solution is to focus on nulling the jamming signal.
Next, we exemplify the effect of the jamming pilot power on the
system performance. Fig. 3 illustrates the achievable rates according
to the values of jamming attack power qt. We fix the user’s trans-
mit powers as pt = pd = 5 dB, and vary the jammer’s transmit
powers qt = qd from −20 dB to 40 dB. As expected, the achiev-
able rate with the MRC decreases with the increase of the jamming
powers. However, it is interesting to see that the proposed schemes,
especially with ZF-type receive filter, still work well with stronger
jamming attacks. This can be explained by the fact that the pro-
posed receive filters are constructed using the estimates of both the
desired channel h and the jamming channel g. When the pilot jam-
ming power qt increases, it does not only degrade the quality of
the desired channel estimation but also improves the quality of the
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Fig. 3. Achievable rates for varying jamming powers.
jamming channel estimation. Thus, the proposed receive filters can
still work well if the improvement of the quality of ĝ overcomes
the degradation on the quality of ĥ. Moreover, we can analytically
observe that the effective SINR ρzf in (13) converges to a non-zero
value when the data jamming power qd tends to infinity as long as
the pilot jamming power qt grows with the same order. The detailed
analysis is omitted here for the brevity.
5. CONCLUSION
A new jamming resistant receiver approach has been proposed to en-
hance the robustness of the massive MIMO uplink against jamming
attacks. By exploiting purposely unused pilot sequences, the jam-
ming channel can be estimated using the received pilot signal. The
results show that the proposed receive filters, which were constructed
using the jamming channel estimate, can greatly reduce the effect of
jamming attack and improve the system performance. Moreover,
the proposed schemes still work well when the jamming powers are
large. Due to the critical effect of the jamming signal, a ZF-type
receive filter, which focuses on nulling the jamming signal is a fa-
vorable solution. However, due to the presence of the jamming pilot
contamination, the optimal receive filter is an open problem that is
left for future research.
6. APPENDIX – PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
When the MMSE-type receive filter is used, i.e., a = ammse =(
ĝĝH + σ
qd
IM
)−1
ĥ, the terms in (6) can be calculated as follows.
· The desired signal term pd|E{aHh|sj}|2
Let us consider
aHh
M
=
ĥH
M
(
ĝĝ
H +
σ
qd
IM
)−1
h
=
ĥH
M
qd
σ
(
IM − ĝĝ
H
σ/qd + ‖ĝ‖2
)
h
=
qd
σ
ĥHh
M
− qd
σ
ĥH ĝ
M
ĝHh
M
σ
Mqd
+ ‖ĝ‖
2
M
, (15)
where the second equality follows from the matrix inversion lemma.
Since h, g, n1 and n2 are all independent, we have the following
large-scale approximations that are tight whenM →∞:
ĥHh
M
=
(α1h+ α2g+ n1)
Hh
M
≍ α1βu, (16)
ĥH ĝ
M
=
(α1h+ α2g+ n1)
H(bg + n2)
M
≍ α∗2bβj, (17)
ĝHh
M
=
(bg + n2)
Hh
M
≍ 0, (18)
‖ĝ‖2
M
≍ γj. (19)
Thus, it follows that a
Hh
M
≍ qd
σ
α1βu and
pd|E{aHh|sj}|2
M2
≍ pd q
2
d
σ2
α21β
2
u. (20)
· The signal gain uncertainty term pdvar{aHh|sj}
By using the large-scale approximations in (15), (17), (18), and
(19) it follows that
aHh
M
≍ qdα1
σ
hHh
M
.
Thus,
var
{
aHh
M
∣∣∣∣sj
}
≍ q
2
dα
2
1
σ2M2
var{hHh}
=
q2dα
2
1
σ2M2
Mβ2u =
q2dα
2
1
σ2M
β2u.
Therefore,
pdvar{aHh|sj}
M2
≍ pd q
2
dα
2
1
σ2M
β2u. (21)
· The jamming term qdE{|aHg|2|sj}
By following similar steps as for the desired signal term, when
M →∞ we have
aHg
M
≍ qd
σ
α∗2βj
σ/(Mqd) + 1
σ/(Mqd) + γj
and
qdE{|aHg|2|sj}
M2
≍ q
3
d
σ2
(
σ/(qdM) + 1
σ/(qdM) + γj
)2
|α2|2β2j . (22)
· The noise term E{‖a‖2|sj}
Once again, by following similar steps as for the desired signal
term, whenM →∞ we have
E{‖a‖2|sj}
M
≍ q
2
d
σ2
(
α21βu+c
2
u+|α2|2βj |b|
2βj+(σ/(qdM)+1)
2
(σ/(qdM)+γj)2
)
.
(23)
Substituting (20), (21), (22), and (23) into (6) we obtain (11).
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